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ARMS CONTROL: SALT II-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT OR
TREATY?
On August 26, 1978; Paul Warnke, director of the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and chief
negotiator of a Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty
with the Soviet Union, stated that the possibility of submitting a
SALT II accord to both houses of Congress as an executive agree-
ment instead of submitting it to the Senate as a treaty "remains
open."'
The public announcement by Warnke followed instructions
issued from President Carter to the United States delegation at
the SALT talks in Geneva to inform the Soviet delegation that he
desired the option of treating the finalized accord as an executive
agreement rather than as a treaty. As a result of these instruc-
tions, the language at the top of the draft text was altered to read
"Draft joint treaty/agreement."2
The immediate response from Senate leaders was typified
by Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd's warning that "the
administration should not resort to an end-run around the
Senate."3 The growing likelihood that any SALT II accord submit-
ted as an executive agreement would be voted down in a Senate
jealous of its constitutional prerogatives, apparently led President
Carter to reconsider his strategy. On January 15, 1979, the Presi-
dent indicated that the finalized agreements would be sent to the
Senate for approval as a treaty."
The executive-congressional maneuvering over the form of
SALT II and the corresponding mode of congressional review was
no mere shadow-boxing. In conjunction with the furor surroun-
ding the President's unilateral decision to abrogate the United
States mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan),
the SALT II classification debate served to dramatize congres-
sional fears that any exclusive executive power to determine the
form of international agreements might prove an effective means
of subverting full congressional participation in the making of
foreign policy. For while the SALT II dispute resulted in an ap-
parent setback to the President, it remains an open question
Carter to Downgrade SALT Pact, Atlanta J. & Const., Aug. 26, 1978, at 1-A.
Id. at 4-A. col. 6.
SALT Treaty or Nothing, Byrd Warns Administration, Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1978, at
2-A, col. 4.
' Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 2, col. 1.
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whether there exist constitutional as well as political restraints
upon executive discretion to classify agreements. This Recent
Development will examine that question in the context of SALT
II.
Although the United States Constitution explicitly governs the
procedural requirements for the presidential exercise of the
treaty-making power,5 the executive agreement is nowhere men-
tioned in that document. As evolved in twentieth-century prac-
tice, the term "executive agreement" actually includes three
types of international agreements: (1) those issued by the Presi-
dent without submssion to the Congress (the true executive
agreement); (2) those issued by the President supplementing an
existing treaty; and (3) those issued by the President after ap-
proval by joint resolution of Congress, requiring simple majorities
in both Houses.' It appears well-settled that this third type of ex-
ecutive agreement (the type which President Carter hoped to
utilize for the SALT II accords) will be deemed a "treaty" within
the meaning of a federal statute.7 Such congressional-executive
agreements have been used extensively since the end of World
War II in order to conclude a variety of political, economic, and
U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, provides:
He [the President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur ....
Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearings on S. 596 Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 (1971) (Statement of Ruhl
J. Bartlett). See also K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 212 (1967).
' The Supreme Court in B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912),
stated that a treaty signifies "a compact between two or more independent nations with a
view of the public welfare." The Court therein also gave judicial cognizance to the inter-
changeable constitutional practices of congressional-executive agreements and treaties. 224
U.S. at 601.
Although an international agreement concluded by joint resolution of Congress must be
within the general legislative competence of Congress, the legislative authority of that
body has, over the years, widened in scope so that it, in reality, encompasses any genuine
concern of foreign affairs. See generally, Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers:
The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PENN. L. REV. 903 (1959).
The American Law Institute is in accord with this view at § 120 of its Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
An international agreement made by the United States as an executive agree-
ment authorized by an Act of Congress may . . . deal with any matter that falls
within any of the powers of the Congress and the President under the Constitu-
tion, even if the matter also falls within the treaty power.
American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 376 (1965).
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military agreements with foreign countries.' Attending the
development of the congressional-executive agreement has been a
debate on its constitutionality." Recently there have been at-
tempts by congressional leaders to restrict the flexibility of the
executive branch in deciding which subject matters should be
negotiated as treaties and which subjects may be classified as
"other international agreements" not requiring the treaty ratifica-
tion process."
The constitutional authority for executive agreements varies
according to the specific type considered. Most true executive
agreements find their basis in Article II, section 2 of the United
States Constitution." Those executive agreements supplementing
an existing treaty are authorized by Article II, section 3 of the
Constitution which provides that the President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed."'2  Finally, executive
agreements approved by a joint resolution of Congress have also
been found to be "in accordance with constitutional
requirements."'3
The distinctions made in United States constitutional law be-
tween the various types of international agreements do not,
however, extend into the sphere of international law. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a "treaty" as "an inter-
' For a thorough review of the use of congressional-executive agreements after World
War II, see J. PAIGE, THE LAW NOBODY KNOWS, Chapter III (1977).
' Compare Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J.
664 (1944), with McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945). See
also, Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945). For
a refutation of McDougal and Lans, see Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign
Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
," See, e.g., Treaty Powers Resolution: Hearings on S. Res. 486 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Congressional Review of Interna-
tional Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scien-
tific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
Case-Zablocki Act, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 612, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1972).
" Id. But see Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings on H.R. 4438
Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Com-
mittee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 68 (1976) (Statement of Raoul
Berger); Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1972).
', U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 3. See also, McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
248 (1945). But see Note, Executive Agreements, The Treaty-Making Clause, and Strict
Cons tructionism, 8 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 587 (1975).
,S E. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 162 (1960).
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national agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single in-
strument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular declaration."' 4 Thus many of the executive agreements
issued by the President of the United States are considered
treaties by the international community.'"
Whether President Carter elects to submit the SALT II accord
as an executive agreement or as a treaty, questions will remain
concerning the scope of the President's power to conclude interna-
tional agreements without the consent of a two-thirds majority of
the Senate. As regards the SALT negotiations, this question
raises particular problems in light of past experiences in seeking
approval of any SALT agreement.'"
Since November 1969, negotiations have progressed toward a
comprehensive treaty outlining the qualitative and quantitative
limitations on arms development. The first breakthrough came on
May 26, 1972, when the United States and the Soviet Union con-
cluded negotiations on a SALT I agreement aimed at the limita-
tion and reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic arms.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty'7  was approved for
ratification by the Senate on August 3, 1972, while the Interim
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969. U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, Article 2. The United States is not a party to this Convention. Staff on
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., The Role of the Senate in Trea-
ty Ratification, at 27 (Comm. Print 1977).
1" See R. Majak, International Agreements: An Analysis of Executive Regulations and
Practices, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress for Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (Comm. Print 1977). See also Treaty Powers
Resolution" Hearings on S. Res. 486 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 66 (1976) (Statement of Richard Falk).
"* See, e.g., the Jackson Amendment to the Interim Agreement, requiring a stiff bargain-
ing stance in future arms talks with regard to the principle of equality in the levels of
strategic arms limitations. The Jackson Amendment had no effect on the terms of the In-
terim Agreement signed at Moscow, but it serves to emphasize the concern of Senators
that the United States is being limited to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior
to those of the Soviet Union. U.S.-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation, H.J. Res. 1227 (1972),
P.L. 92-448 (1972).
" Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503. The ABM Treaty limited the two countries to two antiballistic sites; one
for the defense of each nation's capital and another for the defense of an ICBM (intercon-
tinental ballistic missile) installation in each country. In 1974, a Protocol was signed be-
tween the United States and Soviet Union which restricted each nation to one site only.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration but each party has the right to withdraw on six months
notice if it decides that its supreme interests are jeopardized by "extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty."
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Agreement, 8 after being amended,'9 was passed by joint resolu-
tion of Congress on September 25, 1972. No further progress was
achieved until two years later when bilateral discussions led to
the creation of a joint statement of principles on SALT 0 at
Vladivostok on November 24, 1974, concluded by President Gerald
R. Ford and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brehznev.
Since the summit conference at Vladivostok, negotiations have
continued with the Carter Administration exerting pressure for a
SALT II agreement." In March 1977, United States Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
were able to agree on a three-part framework' for Salt II. Finally,
on September 23, 1977, Secretary of State Vance released a
18 Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3463, T.I.A.S. No. 7504. The Interim Agreement
was approved by joint resolution of Congress and became effective October 3, 1972, as P.L.
92-448. The Interim Agreement placed ceilings on deployment of land-based intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for a five year period unless such agreement was superceded
by a more comprehensive agreement.
" Jackson Amendment, supra note 16.
' Joint American-Soviet Statement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
November 24, 1974, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1974 at 746-747. The Vladivostok Agree-
ment was not approved by the United States Congress and questions as to its scope were
apparent when Secretary of State Vance transmitted proposals for a SALT II accord in
March of 1977. These suggestions were rejected by the Soviets as being inconsistent with
their understanding of the Vladivostok accord. Under the terms of the agreed framework
each side is allowed a maximum of 2,400 offensive strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs,
SLBMs, and bombers) of which 1,320 could be equipped with multiple, individually targeted
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). There is a ban on construction of new fixed ICBM launchers and
on conversion of older fixed launchers from light to heavy ICBMs with limits on deployment
of new types of strategic offensive arms. The duration of the Vladivostok Accord is through
1985 and it incorporates important elements of the Interim Agreement, such as those
relating to verification.
1 In March 1977, the United States offered two alternative proposals for furthering the
SALT process. One proposal would have added significant reductions and qualitative
restraints to the ceilings which were agreed to at Vladivostok. The alternative proposal
was based on the framework agreed to at Vladivostok with the controversial issues con-
cerning the Soviet Backfire bomber and the United States' cruise missiles deferred until
SALT III. Both of these proposals were rejected by the Soviet Union. U.S. Dep't of State
News Release, January 19, 1978 at 14-15.
", This framework accommodated both the Soviet desire to retain the Vladivostok frame-
work for an agreement, and the U.S. desire for more comprehensive limitations. The agree-
ment would consist of three parts: (1) a Treaty which would be in force through 1985 based
on the Vladivostok accord; (2) a Protocol of about three years duration which would cover
certain issues such as cruise missile constraints, mobile ICBM limits, and qualitative con-
straints on ICBMs, while deferring further negotiations on these issues to SALT III; (3) a
Joint Statement of Principles which would be an agreed set of guidelines for future negotia-
tions. U.S. Dep't State, Pub. No. 46, Special Report 7 (1978).
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unilateral declaration indicating the intention of the United States
to take no action inconsistent with the provisions of the 1972
Interim Agreement with the Soviet Union after its expiration on
October 3, 1977, and during the second round of SALT talks, pro-
vided that the Soviet Union exercises similar restraint.23 The
Soviet government issued a similar declaration three days later."
Thus the history of SALT 1 negotiations reveals the use of
both the executive agreement, issued by the President after ap-
proval by a joint resolution of Congress (evidenced by the Interim
Agreement), and the true executive agreement (illustrated by the
Vladivostok agreement).
While the congressional-executive agreement has been in use
for over a century as an alternative to the treaty mode of con-
cluding international agreements, this fact alone does not confirm
its constitutionality. The congressional-executive agreement was
first utilized in the nineteenth century during a period of expan-
sion through territorial acquisition. On April 12, 1844, Secretary
of State John C. Calhoun entered into a Treaty of Annexation
with representatives of the Republic of Texas. 5 In June 1844, the
Senate failed to approve the treaty for ratification.' Immediately
thereafter President Tyler submitted the treaty with all the at-
tending correspondence to the Congress for consideration.
Secretary of State Calhoun declared:
It is admitted that what was sought to be effected by the Treaty
submitted to the Senate, may be secured by a joint resolution of
the two houses of Congress, incorporating all its provisions. This
mode of effecting it will have the advantage of requiring only a
majority of the two houses instead of the two-thirds of the
Senate.
President Tyler was in full accord with Calhoun's views when he
stated that "the power of Congress is . .. fully competent in some
2 N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1977, § A at 1, col. 2. See Recent Development, 19 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 372 (1978), and the discussion therein concerning the unilateral declaration policy state-
ment and its possible violation of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of
1961, which requires that any agreement limiting the armaments of the United States must
be approved either by treaty or act of Congress.
' N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1977, 5A at 10, col. 3.
2 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 697 (H. Miller ed.
1934).
" W. HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 75 (1964).
l 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 703 (H. Miller ed.
1934).
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form of proceeding to accomplish everything that a formal ratifica-
tion of the treaty could have accomplished .. . ." Thus, on March
1, 1845, the State of Texas was formally annexed by joint resolu-
tion of Congress,' marking the origin of the use of the usual
legislative process for the creation of formal international
agreements.
Joint resolutions of Congress have been utilized not only in the
area of territorial acquisitions"0 but also to effect United States
membership in international organizations" and to conclude inter-
national commercial agreements.2 Such congressional-executive
agreements will remain in force until they expire according to
their own terms or are rescinded by negotiation, unless the act of
Congress pursuant to which they were negotiated or by which
they were ratified is repealed prior to that time. These limitations
are neither greater nor less than those imposed in the case of a
treaty, which also ceases to bind domestically when a contrary
statute is enacted.- Congressional-executive agreements, like
treaties, are the supreme law of the land, second only to the Con-
stitution of the United States.34
In practice, therefore, Presidents have the option to submit an
international agreement to Congress for approval by joint resolu-
4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 323 (J. Richardson ed. 1904).
2 On March 1, 1845, by a Senate vote of 27 in favor to 25 against, and a House vote of 132
in favor and 76 against the Congress of the United States passed the Joint Resolution for-
mally annexing Texas. 5 Stat. 797 (1845).
" On June 1, 1870, the Senate rejected a Treaty of Annexation with Hawaii. President
McKinley thereafter submitted the treaty for ratification by a joint resolution following the
precedent of Texas. On July 6, 1898, the Treaty was approved by the Congress. See 31
CONG. REC. 5770-5973, 6140-6693 (1898).
" Although the United States Senate rejected in 1920 the Treaty of Versailles which in-
corporated the Covenant of the League of Nations, on June 19, 1934, Congress, by a Joint
Resolution, approved Article XXIII of the Treaty of Versailles, so far as membership and
approval of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization was concerned. 48
Stat. 1182 (1934). On March 28, 1944, the United States became a member of the United Na-
tions Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Also by Joint Resolution, the United States
undertook the functions of membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the
International Refugee Organization, and the World Health Organization. J. PAIGE, sUpra
note 6, at 56-57.
, These international agreements have normally been approved by acts of Congress also
requiring a majority vote in each House, the only difference being that these acts are con-
sidered congressional legislation, while agreements approved by joint resolution are con-
sidered international agreements. See J. PAIGE, THE LAW NOBODY KNOWS 57 (1977).
" McDougal and Lans, supra note 7, at 346.
'4 U.S. CONST. Art. 6, cl. 2; B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
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tion or submit it to the Senate as a treaty. However, in this post-
Vietnam, post-Watergate era of congressional attempts to restrict
the executive branch's decisionmaking flexibility," political
realities may dictate the course of Presidential action. This
change in the political atmosphere has led the State Department
to begin revision of its Circular 175 procedures for classification,
negotiation, and ratification of international agreements. 6 These
procedures are officially described as "internal guidelines or infor-
mation to be followed to facilitate the application of orderly pro-
cedures in the negotiation, signature, publication, and registra-
tion"37 of treaties and other international agreements.
Critics of the Circular 175 procedures maintain that since it is
an internal, executive memorandum not subject to judicial review,
"it leaves firmly in the hands of the State Department the crucial
function of deciding whether any particular international commit-
ment should be deemed to be within the category of matters ap-
propriately handled by treaty or by executive agreement."' This
unilateral classification prerogative effectively gives, according to
these critics, the executive branch exclusive authority to inter-
pret the constitutional treaty power of Article II. Although the
Circular 175 revisions were intended to clarify the classification
procedures by specifying the subject matters best handled under
Article II guidelines of advice and consent, the current version
fails in this respect. The major drawback is that it "allows exten-
sive discretion with respect to consultation with Congress on an-
ticipated and proposed international agreements."39
Congressional initiatives in the area of international agreement
classification have yet to greatly influence this process, resulting
" See, e.g. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541-47 (Supp. V 1975).
R. Majak, supra note 15. The State Department's procedures for handling treaties and
other international agreements of the United States are concentrated in Chapter 700,
Volume 11, of the Foreign Affairs Manual. They are known generally as the Circular 175
procedures.
" 39 Fed. Reg. 29604 (1974).
" J. AM. INT'L L. PROC. 71st Ann. Meeting, "Treaties and Executive Agreements" (com-
ments by Thomas Franck) at 254.
"' Id The current Procedures were revised last on August 16, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 29640
(1977). According to Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, in testifying
before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee on May
13, 1975, the purpose of further revising the Procedures was two-fold: "(1) to meet requests
by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to clarify the guidelines to be con-
sidered in determining whether a particular international agreement should be concluded
as a treaty or as another form of international agreement; and (2) to strengthen provisions
on consultation with the Congress." 1975 Dig. of U.S. Prac. in Int'l L. 295.
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largely in a discretionary policy of treaty negotiation, classifica-
tion and ratification. However, some efforts have been made to
diminish this discretion. The first successful attempt at imposing
definitive guidelines in this area was the Case-Zablocki Act of
1972.40 This law requires any international agreement other than a
treaty to be transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Con-
gress as soon as is practicable after it goes into force, but not later
than sixty days thereafter."
In 1975, there was an unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the
Case-Zablocki Act by means of the proposed Morgan-Zablocki
Bill," also referred to as the Executive Agreements Review Act of
1975. The Bill would have required the President to place before
Congress for sixty days any proposed national commitment.'" Dur-
ing that period, the proposed agreement would be subject to a
legislative veto by concurrent resolution of both Houses." This
scheme would not only have increased the participation of the
House in the treaty-making process, but would also have lessened
the influence of the Senate in the determination of United States
foreign policy.
More recently, in 1976, the Treaty Powers Resolution, also
referred to as the Clark Resolution after its proponent, Senator
Dick Clark of Iowa, was advanced to reaffirm the Senate's
prerogative in the treaty-making process. According to Senator
Clark, this resolution expressed the sense of the Senate
that international agreements involving significant
political, military, or economic commitments to foreign
countries properly constitute treaties which should be sub-
mitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. The resolu-
tion further expresses the sense of the Senate that, in
determining whether an international agreement properly
41 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1976).
41 Id.
42 See Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
" National commitments "were defined as including any agreement regarding the intro-
duction, basing, or deployment of United States armed forces on foreign territory, or pro-
viding to a foreign country, government or people any military training or equipment
including component parts and technology, any nuclear technology, or any financial or
material resource." Id at 3.
" Id at 2.
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constitutes a treaty, the President should consult with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee."5
The resolution went on to affirm that in the case of any agreement
which has not been submitted as a treaty, the Senate may
nonetheless make a finding that such agreement should have been
so submitted." Once the Senate designates an agreement as pro-
perly constituting a treaty, a point of order could be brought
against consideration of any legislation which would provide funds
to execute the agreement in question, unless that agreement was
subsequently submitted to the Senate as a treaty.47 This proposal
would have amended the Standing Rules of the Senate to reflect a
new procedure by which proposals for international agreements
would be reviewed. However, this resolution was never reported
out of committee.
In 1978, a similar Treaty Powers Resolution provision was in-
troduced by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as section
502 of S.3076, the Senate's version of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for 1977.8 Although passed by the Senate, the
provision was deleted in conference.49 While it would appear that
congressional reluctance to impose strict statutory requirements
on the President's choice of international legal instruments il-
lustrates a wide acceptance of discretionary executive decision
making authority, it is also possible that congressional inability to
legislate in this area reflects more the competing interests of
the House and Senate in imposing such requirements.
The restrictions which have been imposed by Congress on the
decision making flexibility of the executive branch with regard to
international agreements affect the SALT negotiations in many
ways. First, as an example of a restriction on executive authority,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 19 6 1 5 specifically pro-
hibits any agreement which obligates the United States to limit
its armaments without authorization by Congress either through
legislation or through the Senate's consent to a treaty. The recent
Treaty Powers Resolution: Hearings on S. Res. 486 Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (Opening statement of Senator Clark).
a I&
47 1&.
" See S. 3076, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 502 (1978) and S. Rep. No. 95-842, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 50-55 (1978).
" H. Rep. No. 95-1535, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1978).
-o 22 U.S.C. § 33 (1970).
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unilateral declaration by the President of the United States to
take no action inconsistent with the expired SALT I agreement
may have violated this provision of the 1961 Act.5" Second, as an
example of the problems which can arise from the exercise of
unilateral executive authority, when the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations of the House of Representatives asked the
Secretary of State "what authority the executive branch claimed
to enter into the Vladivostok Agreement on SALT," they were in-
formed that "it was interpreted by the State Department lawyers
not to be an international agreement."52
The Soviet Union's rebuff of the Carter Administration's wide
ranging proposals for a SALT II accord' can be viewed as a
response to the State Department's classification of the
Vladivostok Agreement as not being an international agreement.
The Soviets disagreed with this classification and were reluctant
to bargain with the United States on proposals based upon the
Vladivostok Agreement when the United States refused to
acknowledge its validity. This is a clear example of the far
reaching consequences which can result from a failure to receive
congressional approval, either by way of joint resolution or treaty,
of an arms limitation agreement. It further indicates the necessity
of requiring the executive branch to consult with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations
Committee before submitting any international agreement for ap-
proval by the Senate as a treaty or by the Congress in the form of
a joint resolution. Ultimately, in order to have a strong, uniform
and consistent foreign policy, congressional-executive relations
must improve in the area of classification, consultation and
ratification.
Undoubtedly, certain factors must dictate the form which any
final agreement will take, and it is understood that any accord
reached between the United States and the Soviet Union will con-
template permanent guidelines on the further limitation of
strategic arms. This fact, coupled with the sensitive subject mat-
ter of SALT negotiations, should favor the use of the treaty
ratification process for such an agreement. If ratified by treaty,
the problems associated with the Vladivostok Agreement,
specifically the questions concerning its validity as an interna-
51 Id
' Congressional Review of International Agreements, supra note 11, at 7.
See note 21 supra.
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tional agreement, would be avoided.
On the other hand, one advocate for approval of international
agreements by joint resolution of Congress has argued per-
suasively for its adoption as a method giving "an equal role to the
House of Representatives."' This process also assures that both
Houses will approve (or disapprove) the agreement in the first in-
stance, avoiding the danger that the House of Representatives
might refuse to give legislative implementation to a treaty
already ratified by the Senate.' Finally, while a treaty often has
to go to the House and back to the Senate for implementation
after ratification in the Senate, a congressional-executive agree-
ment goes to both Houses initially for consent and implementa-
tion, thereby saving a step in the process. 6 A leading observer of
the arms control negotiations has warned, however, that "without
advance Congressional authorization to use this form, any voting
advantage of the joint resolution might well be dissipated""7 by
criticism that the President is shirking his constitutional duty to
obtain advice and consent of the Senate.
It must be concluded that the decision whether to submit a
SALT II accord for approval as a treaty or as a congressional-
executive agreement was essentially political in nature. In any
event, it is imperative that congressional-executive relations im-
prove so that international agreements entered into on behalf of
the United States may have binding force in the international
community. If President Carter had decided to submit the accord
for approval by joint resolution of Congress, it is understood that
liberal Democratic Senators normally in support of his foreign
policy initiatives would have to vote to reject the agreement.,'
Thus, President Carter must exercise caution in seeking the ap-
14 L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1972).
SId.
" Id at 175-76.
57 Bunn, Missile Limitation. By Treaty or Otherwise?, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1970).
According to discussions with one informed Capitol Hill source, this group includes
Senator Church of Idaho, Senator Hart of Colorado, and Senator McIntyre of New Hamp-
shire. As a result of recent elections, Carter's problems will probably be increased by the
rightward shift among the incoming legislators. Senator McIntyre, a member of the Armed
Services Committee and a provisional supporter of SALT II, will be replaced by Gordon
Humphrey, who opposes SALT and says he plans to be the "biggest skinflint" in Washing-
ton. Time, Nov. 20, 1978 at 18. Asked whether the November congressional elections had
dimmed the chances of approval of a projected strategic arms accord, Secretary of State
Vance said it was not yet clear. Atlanta J. & Const., November 26, 1978, at 22-A, col. 1. Cer-
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proval of the SALT II accord in any form. Although proposals to
restrict the executive decision making flexibility have met with
sure defeat in the past, the future may hold new variables which
might influence passage of a Treaty Powers-type resolution. On
such an important matter as limiting strategic arms, the form in
which an agreement is submitted should not give rise to un-
necessary impediments to its approval and ratification. Doubtless
it is a futile venture to attempt to designate which subject
matters should properly be negotiated as "other international
agreements." The State Department's Circular 175 procedures
outline nine considerations for selecting among constitutionally
authorized procedures. 59 The ninth consideration typifies the
futility of trying to establish guidelines for such selection:
"In determining whether any international agreement should be
brought into force as a treaty or as an international agreement
other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid
any invasion or compromise of the constitutional powers of the
Senate, the Congress as a whole, or the President.""0
However, it is these powers, delegated separately by the Con-
stitution to the respective branches of government, which have
escaped definition and firm boundaries for almost two hundred
years and which underlie the current struggle to gain control of
the classification process.
Constitutionally, the President has the option to submit the
SALT II accord to the Congress for approval by joint resolution
or to submit it in treaty form to the Senate. It should be noted
that the approval of international agreements by joint resolution
of Congress is a uniquely participatory method of domestic
governmental operations and should remain available in the
scheme of congressional-executive decision making in the area of
foreign policy. But politically, the President probably has no
option and will submit such an agreement to the Senate for its
advice and consent rather than risk the possibility of future con-
tainly the Carter Administration will have to deal with a transformed Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. It is in this committee that the conservative trend of the last election is
likely to be most evident, with such prominent conservatives as Jesse Helms of North
Carolina and John Tower of Texas, among others, playing a much more aggressive role in
the conduct of American foreign policy.
I See R. Majak, note 15 supra, at 57.
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gressional attempts to restrain his discretionary decision making
authority.
Keith E. Fryer
J. Michael Levengood
